Showing posts with label CERCLA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CERCLA. Show all posts

Sunday, July 3, 2011

CERCLA Workplace Exclusion Does Not Bar EPA Cost Recovery Action

Defendant argued EPA had no authority to perform removal action involving plating lines where the release results in exposure exclusively within a workplace. Section 9601(22)(A) excludes from the statutory definition of release "any release which results in exposure to persons solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim which such persons may assert against the employer of such persons". 

The court ruled that Saporito could not benefit from this exclusion because this case did not involve a claim by a person against their employer. The court also rejected argument that the "consumer product in consumer use" exception in the definition of "facility" did not apply to electroplating business. US v Saporito, 2011 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 66456 (N.D.Ill. 6/22/11)

Many consultants and clients have mistakenly believed that vapor intrusion is not covered in the standard phase 1 scope of work because of workplace exclusion. In do doing, they have ignored the second half of the clause that limits the exclusion to circumstances where a person has made a claim against its employer.  . As a result, the potential for vapor intrusion has frequently not been evaluated.

This clause is actually a relic from a bill that had been considered by the US House of Representatives prior to the passage of CERCLA. That bill would have provided a remedy for personal injury due to exposure to hazardous substances. The workplace exclusion was intended to prevent a double recovery by precluding recovery where the worker had filed a workers compensation claim. The remedy for personal injuries was deleted from CERCLA during the last minute negotiations but the workplace exclusion was inadvertabtly left  in legislation that became  CERCLA

Sunday, January 30, 2011

Purchaser Qualifies for BFPP Defense

In 3000 E.Imperial, LLC v Robertshaw Controls Co, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138661 (C.D. Cal. 12/29/10), the purchaser acquired property in November 2006 that had been formerly used to manufacture aircraft and missile valves as well as furniture manufacturing. Plaintiff learned the site had been contaminated during its pre-acquisition diligence. After acquiring title, plaintiff demolished the manufacturing building which occupied 90% of the site and completed additional investigations.

A September 2007 report identified two areas of concern: AOC 1 was the location of former USTs and a former maintenance shed.  AOC 2 was the former manufacturing building and was impacted from TCE. Plaintiff drained the USTs which had residual TCE. The USTs were excavated in 2009. Plaintiff incurred approximately $1.7MM in response costs and sought reimbursement under CERCLA and the California superfund law.

Defendant argued that plaintiff did not qualify for the federal and state Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser (BFPP) Defenses failed to exercise appropriate care. In particular, the defendant asserted that plaintiff unreasonably delayed excavating the USTs until 2009.

Court said  that under the California BFPP (codified at Health & Safety Code 25395.69), "appropriate care" is defined as the performance of response actions directed by the Department of Toxic Substances (DTSC). Since the plaintiff was working under DTSC supevision, the court ruled that the plaintiff satisfied the state BFPP test.

For the CERCLA BFPP, the court noted that the plaintiff sampled the contents of the USTs in May 2007, six months after it acquired title. In September 2007, the plaintiff received its report from its consultants and then drained the USTs in October 2007, placing the contents into 20 drums that were then properly disposed. The court held that the plaintiff taken "reasonable steps" because it  emptied the USTs "soon after learning that they contained a hazardous substances". The court rejected the notion that the plaintiff acted unreasonably when it waited until 2009 to excavate the USTs, noting that there was no evidence the delay allowed additional TCE to discharge into the environment. Moreover, the defendant did not produce any evidence to suggest that plaintiff should have suspected that TCE remained in the USTs.  Indeed, when the USTs were removed, the court said, the contents consisted almost entirely of water. Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiff had satisfied the BFPP defense by taking reasonable steps to prevent further releases of hazardous substances.

This case contrasts with the Ashley II case we discussed two months ago where the purchaser failed to follow recommendations in the phase 1 to clean out sumps and floor drains. In that case, it appears there was some evidence that this failure may have allowed some contamination to migrate into sensitive wetlands and surface waters.

These two cases illustrates that courts are going to scrutinize the actions of a purchaser who is asserting a defense to see if they complied with post-acqusition continuing obligations. I suspect the courts in this process probably engage in some "monday morning quarterbacking" when evaluating the reasonableness of the purchaser's decisions. Decisions will be evaluated in the context of the totality of information known to the court at the time of the lawsuit. Facts that perhaps were not known at the time may in hindsight look like information that a purchaser should have known or considered.

In the Robertshaw Controls case, the plaintiff got lucky when it left the tanks in the ground for another two years until it was ready to develop the site since it was able to drain all of the TCE from the tanks. In Ashley II, the developer did not immediately cleanout the sumps and drains, and there was evidence that stormwater runoff was flowing into the wetlands and surface waters.

Because the BFPP is a self-implementing defense and because parties will be subject to second guessing by a judge who will have the benefit of hindsight, it is important that parties seeking to assert the defense carefully evaluate the risks posed by their sites. It might also be advisable to do the work under a state voluntary cleanup agreement to cloak the work with the presumption of reasonableness and perhaps even consistency with the NCP. Even if the state requires some additional work that a purchaser might not necessarily be REQUIRED to perform to comply with the BFPP, the greater protection that would be afforded by such work will probably be worth it in terms of peace of mind and litigation costs that are avoided.       
     

Thursday, January 27, 2011

Ashley II Charleston LLC v. PCS Nitrogen-the most important CERCLA case of 2010?

In the first reported case to interpret the scope of the "appropriate care" requirements of the CERCLA Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser (BFPP) defense, a  federal district court in South Carolina ruled that an entity owned by the brownfield developer Cherokee failed to qualify for the BFPP when it failed to address impacts from RECs that had been identified in a phase 1 report. Ashley II Charleston LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, 2010 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 104772 (D.S.C. 9/20/10)

The phase 1 identified sumps and conrete pads as RECs. When the developer demolished all of the above-ground structures on that parcel, it failed to clean out and fill in the sumps,  leaving them exposed to the elements which may have exacerbated these environmentl conditions.

The court was also troubled by the fact that the developer indemnified the prior owners of the site. The court said this called into question whether the developer had complied with the "no affiliation" requirement of the BFPP defense.

Also of interest was the court's observation that the phase 1 did not strictly comply with the AAI requirements in effect at the time of the acquisition but that the deviation was not significant. Therefore, the court found the developer had complied with the AAI aspect of the BFPP defense.

The facts are dense and complicated. Here are the Key findings of Court:

1. plaintiff failure to perform sampling recommended in phase 1 and failure to address RECs was failure to comply with "appropriate care" requirements. ("Doing nothing in the face of know or suspected environmental hazard" was insufficient to establish appropriate care).

2. Plaintif failure to maintain cover on site. Only added crushed rock when parcel was about to be leased, thereby allowing contamination runoff to spread contaminants.

3. Plaintiff Indemnity provided in purchase agreements coupled with urging EPA not to proceed against former landowners raised "no affiliation" question. ("Ashley efforts to discourage EPA from recovering response costs covered by the indemnification reveals just the sort of affiliation Congress intended to discourage")--DOES THIS MEAN PURCHASERS CANNOT INDEMNIFY SELLERS TO ASSERT BFPP???

4. Defendants could not assert third party/ILO defense because of earth moving/grading activities

5. Distinguished between apportionment and allocation. Harm was indivisible and incapable of apportionment but court allocated liability for purposes of contribution action.

Sunday, January 9, 2011

An Explanation of the CERCLA Indoor Air Exclusion and its Implications for E1527 and E2600

For years, lawyers and environmental consultants have puzzled over the meaning of the indoor air exclusion of CERCLA. The definition of release excludes  any releases which (1) results in exposure to persons solely within a workplace and  (2) with respect to a claim which such persons may assert against their employer.
This was a puzzling provision since it refers to exposure to persons yet CERCLA does not provide any remedy for personal injury. Over time, the second clause of the exclusion was ignored so that many consultants came to believe that indoor was not covered by a phase 1 unless the client specifically requested such coverage. Indeed, ASTM E1527 provides that indoor air quality along with radon, lead-based paint and asbestos are  non-scope items.

Adding to the confusion is that ASTM E1527 also provides that a recognized environmental condition can include releases into building structures. The uncertainy over the indoor air exclusion was largely ignored until EPA and state remedial programs began focusing on vapor intrusion. Now that vapor intrusion is increasingly becoming a popular tool for toxic tort lawyers, environmental consultants are growing concerned that they may become subject to malpractice actions or breach of contract actions for failing to assess VI during their phase 1 reports.

While doing research on my upcoming article "Playing Poker With Pollution" which calls for revising the CERCLA reporting obligations and  sampling of RECs for owners to satisfy their AAI obligations, I came across language in the preamble to the original section 103 reporting obligations that appears to shed light on the meaning of the indoor air exclusion.

According to EPA, the indoor exclusion was a relic of an earlier House bill that had contemplated that CERCLA would provide a remedy for personal injury. Apparently this section was left in the legislation after Congress decided to drop the provision providing for a remedy for personal injury due to exposure to releases of hazardous substances.  This also explains the second clause of the exclusion referring to workers compensation claims. The old bill would have provided relief to person injured in the workplace from releases of hazardous substances unless they could file a workers compensation claim to avoid duplicate claims.

So, the answer to the decades-long answer is that releases of hazardous substances into indoor air should be covered by phase 1 reports. Of course, whether the applicable standard is the OSHA PELs or levels established for state remedial programs is a discussion for another post.

Monday, December 27, 2010

EPA Seeking Comment on Integrated Cleanup Initiative

EPA has initiated a three-year strategy, called the Integrated Cleanup Initiative, to identify and implement improvements to the Agency’s land cleanup programs. The Initiative will identify and implement opportunities to integrate and leverage the Agency’s land cleanup authorities to accelerate cleanups, address a greater number of contaminated sites, and put these sites back into productive use while protecting human health and the environment.

Item 2B indicates  that the evaluation to determine if VI should be expressly addressed in the HRS has been made and that a notice will be issued in January to begin the public process of moving forward with this revision.
Item 3 also indicate that regional offices will be expected to perform more robust PRP searches and that metrics will be established to measure progress on this goal
Items 12A/B and 13 reaffirm the enforcement first policy and suggests this will be done earlier in the remedy process

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

Home Builder Seeks Cost Recovery Despite No Pre-Acquisition Diligence

We all know that lender due diligence and underwriting standards were "lax" during the great real estate bubble of the past decade. However, I continue to be astounded by the indifference that developers exhibited to environmental issues since after all they were taking title to potentially contaminated land. Now that the developers have been stuck with cleanups and are unable to sell the homes, they are trying to use lawsuits to compensate for their lack of diligence.  Following is a recent example of such a case. I will discuss another interesting case in a separate post.

In KB Homes v Rockville TBD Corp. George and Patricia Kopetsky (Kopetsky) purchased some unimproved farmland in 1989 that was adjacent to the defendant Rockville plant that manufactured airplane components. Kopetsky did not perform any environmental due diligence prior to acquiring the farm land.
As part of a 1993 asset sale, an environmental investigation determined that TCE had been discharged into the facility’s septic system located on the eastern portion of the property. In 1995, the defendant entered into the Indiana Voluntary Remediation Program of the facility and subsequently determined but the levels were below the cleanup standards. The septic system was decommissioned and the Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM) issued a Certificate of Completion in 1996.  A subsequent investigation performed on the western portion of the property in 1997 and 1998 revealed a plume of TCE-contaminated groundwater that had migrated from the facility and beneath a portion of the Koetsky’s farmland.
In the meantime, the Kopetsky submitted a plat plan for a subdivision known as Cedar Park in 1998. After they received plat approval, Kopetsky entered into a lot purchase and option agreement with Dura Builders.

In the agreement, Kopetsky represented that the Cedar Park land was free of any hazardous materials and promised that he would, at each closing, execute a vendor's affidavit certifying the environmental condition of the lot The affidavits stated, in part, that the land did not contain any hazardous waste or materials, and that no disclosure statement was required to be filed pursuant to the Indiana Responsible Property Transfer Law. Kopetsky also represented to their lender that “after due investigation and inquiry, no contamination was present at the property.

In 1999, Dura Builders began purchasing lots from Kopetsky but did not perform any environmental due diligence either before executing the lot purchase agreement or actually purchasing the individual lots.  In 2002, a consultant retained by Cedar Park provided Kopetsky with groundwater monitoring results showing that a portion of the Cedar Park property was impacted with TCE-contaminated groundwater. A cleanup to non-residential standard was proposed but Kopetsky objected because since this would prevent the sale of the land for residential development.  Kopetsky continued to sell lots to Dura Builders but did not notify Dura of the contamination.

In 2004, KB Homes acquired Dura Builders. KB did not conduct environmental due diligence prior to acquiring Dura Buildings. Indeed, KB did not learn of the contaminationuntil March 2005 when KB had performed its own sampling. KB was forced to halt construction as buyers were either unable to obtain financing or walked away from their contracts. In 2007, KB filed a complaint against Rockville, Kopetsky, and Patriot Engineering for negligence, trespass, nuisance, breach of contract and constructive fraud. KB requested damages for reduction in value of its property as a result of the TCE contamination; legal and consultant fees; fees paid to maintaining the lots and homes; and interest on the capital investment made unproductive by the contamination.

The trial court granted Rockville’s motion for summary judgment and KB appealed. The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed that the KB could not bring a trespass claim because it did not have possession of the land at the time that the activity that caused the contamination had occurred.

On the nuisance claim, the appeals court said the lower court erred when it found that Rockville could have not foreseen that a release of TCE could harm an adjoining property. However, the court went on that under Indiana law, the nuisance claims could not proceed because Rockville had sold the property in 1993 and the actions that caused the contamination had occurred prior to the time KB acquired the sale.

For the negligence claim, though, the appeals court said that the trial court had erred when it granted summary judgment. The trial court had that the damages that KB sought were economic in nature and therefore were not recoverable in a negligence action. Under the economic loss doctrine, parties may not use tort law to try to evade an allocation of risk that was negotiated in a contract. However, the appeals court said that KB did not have a contractual relationship with Rockville so its negligence claim was not an attempt to circumvent a contractual limitation. KB’s claims against Kopetsky and Patriot Engineering have yet to be resolved.

Brownfield Developer Relying on EPA Assessment Seeks Cost Recovery from PRP

In Shenandoah LLC v. Green Mountain Power, David Shlansky entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with Green Mountain Power Corp. (GMP) in June 2003 to acquire the Haviland Shade Roller Mill for $150K. GMP and its predecessors had owned the property since 1926 but had leased it to predecessors of Goodrich Corporation beginning in 1942 who manufactured airplane parts.
In the purchase agreement, GMP made a number of representations and warranties including that (1) it had not received any written notices of alleged violations of federal, state or local laws regarding the property, and (2) that to its actual knowledge “but without inspection”, there were no hazardous wastes or toxic materials located at the property whose generation, disposal or storage would have been regulated. The representations were to survive one year.

Shlansky was also given a 60 day inspection period to determine if the environmental conditions of the property were satisfactory including but not limited to hazardous materials in the buildings, groundwater and soils. If the inspection revealed conditions that were unsatisfactory to Shlansky, the agreement provided that Shlansky could terminate the agreement upon five days written notice. Shlansky reportedly asked the GMP facilities manager if GMP had performed any environmental assessments of the site. Allegedly, the facilities manager told Shlansky that an environmental assessment had been performed, that no contamination had been discovered other than some asbestos pipe wrap, that the report was prepared by a competent consultant but that it was the policy of GMP not to disclose such reports “to preserve the privilege of such reports”.  Shlansky subsequently entered into an addendum to the agreement where the parties acknowledged that all contingencies that would entitle the buyer to terminate the agreement had been waived or satisfied..

In July 2004, Shlansky entered into an assignment agreement with Shenandoah whereby the Shenandoah acquired Shlansky’s rights to acquire the site. After Shenandoah obtained the required local permits for the proposed redevelopment project, it contacted the Addison County Regional Planning Commission who had obtained a grant from EPA to perform brownfield assessment grants. The Commission entered into an agreement with ATC to perform a phase 1 of the site. The phase 1 was completed in November 2007-three years after Shenandoah acquired title to the site. The phase 1 recommended additional investigation of staining on wooden flooring and other areas that could have been impacted from historical uses. The phase 2 which was also funded by the Commission and approved by EPA’s brownfield grant program was completed in September 2008. The phase 2 identified elevated levels of PCBs in the main building and an annex along with SVOCs, TCE in soil gas and diesel range organics in the soils. ATC recommended that the PCB-contaminated wood flooring be removed, a soil management plan be implemented during construction activities and that vapor mitigation system be installed along with a vapor barrier as engineered controls.
In an exchange of letters beginning in December 2008, Shenandoah LLC (Shenandoah) sent a letter to GMP requesting that GMP accept responsibility for the costs to remove all hazardous building materials from the property. The letter claimed that GMP was a responsible party under CERCLA and that Shenandoah was relieved from liability under the 2002 brownfield amendments to CERCLA. GMP responded that the presence of hazardous materials in building materials did not trigger CERCLA liability and that to the extent there was a release into the environment, Shenandoah was not relieved of liability because it had not performed an appropriate inquiry prior to acquisition. Moreover, as assignee of Shlansky, GMP said that Shenandoah had waived its inspection rights under the agreement and therefore GMP had no obligation under the agreement to remedy the environmental conditions at the site. Shenandoah then filed a seven-count complaint seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that GMP is liable under CERCLA along with breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation and fraud counts.

This case has lots of yummy kernels. The copy of the agreement that was attached to complaint has handwritten notes in the margins of the inspection paragraph indicating that “we did rely, we relied on their reps”. If true, this was a classic blunder by the purchaser. Environmental representations and warranties should never be used in lieu of environmental due diligence. The proper role of representations and warranties is to help the purchaser narrow the issues that need to be investigated. Here, with a facility that had been used since 1926 for a variety of industrial purposes, reliance on written representations and any alleged oral representations of the facility manager was just plain foolish. This is just another example of a purchaser being penny wise and pound foolish by trying to avoid the rather minimal costs of a phase 1 and phase 2.

Likewise, the plaintiff obviously did not understand the requirements of the CERCLA bona fide purchaser and innocent landowner defenses when it neglected to perform a phase 1 prior to taking title to the property. And even when it proceeded to have a phase 1 performed three years later, it had the work done by a consultant retained and paid for by the regional commission. While the preamble to the AAI rule indicated that local governments could conduct all appropriate inquiries for a third party, all aspects of the AAI rule must be satisfied. Without the benefit of a pre-acquisition phase 1, Shenandoah could not satisfy a number of AAI requirements including the relationship of the purchase price to the fair market value, any specialized knowledge of the purchaser at the time of purchase, the presence of environmental liens as well as commonly known and reasonably ascertainable information .

Despite the language in the three paragraphs in the preamble to the final AAI rule allowing all appropriate inquiries to be done by one party and transferred to another, it remains good practice for persons seeking to assert one of the CERCLA landowner liability protections to conduct their own AAI investigation, especially where the transferee is going to redevelop the property. Environmental due diligence involves a series of complicated tradeoffs and a person who does not intend to be the ultimate developer of a site may have very different risk tolerances than the person who is going to be moving dirt, incur remedial risk and long-term obligations associated with the property.

Information gathered by local governments as part of brownfield assessment grants can certainly be used in subsequent phase 1 reports and can be helpful in refining the issues associated with a particular site. However, the person who seeks to claim the liability protection should perform its own AAI-compliant report.

Based on the reps and warranties in the contract as well as the narrative in the complaint, it appears that Shenandoah may have anticipated that the only environmental risks at the property would be lead-based paint and asbestos. Perhaps Shenandoah was only focused on these building interior issues. In any event, the agreement contained what is known as a “big boy” clause which states that there were no other covenants, promises, agreements, conditions or understandings, oral or written, except as herein set forth.” In the absence of fraud, courts tend to uphold “big boy” clauses especially when coupled with a statement that the agreement embodies the entire agreement and understandings between the parties. It is very difficult to prove a fraud case. As pled, the facts in this case do not paint the kind of sympathetic picture that might lead a court to conclude that the plaintiff was victimized by the seller. It will be interesting how the court handles this case. In the meantime, the best option for the plaintiff might be to go back to the brownfield grantee and try to apply for a brownfield cleanup loan.

Tuesday, October 19, 2010

Dirty Little (Environmental) Secrets

Nearly all state and federal environmental cleanup laws have reporting obligations. However, the circumstances and parties who have the obligation to report contamination will vary significantly. In many cases, the reporting obligations are linked to the discovery of contamination that exceeds a reportable quantity or RQ. The RQ will vary according to the particular contaminant.

At first glance, this may seem like a reasonable approach. However, when one 'digs' a little deeper, it becomes clear that the way reporting obligations are structured have actually facilitated the proliferation of brownfields and allows many sellers of corporate property to keep the presence of contamination secret. Indeed, a common provision now appearing in transactional documents is a so-called 'No Look' or 'No Hunt' clause that prevents the buyer from conducting further investigations on its property if it wants to maintain the contractual protections it obtained from the seller. In fact, it is not uncommon for  environmental lawyers to spend a significant amount of time on deals negotiating and drafting what and how information about contamination is to be disclosed.

The reason for all this is because the reporting obligations are often expressed in terms of the discharge of a certain quantity of a chemical over a certain period of time such as 24 hours. Now, back in the 1970s this made alot of sense when environmental management practices were still in their infancy and the principal problem was stopping ongoing discharges of hazardous substances.

Management of hazardous substances and wastes has significantly improved over the nearly three decades since the passage of CERCLA and RCRA so that NEW discharges from a facility are no longer the most important concern.  Instead, it is the legacy of historical contamination from these past practices that have had to continually confront.

Unfortunately, the reporting obligations often do not address purely historical contamination since (1) the regulations often use present tense gerunds such as spilling, discharging, releasing, disposing and  (2) it is difficult to determine how much of the contamination was discharged over the relevant reporting period. In otherwords, was it a drip, drip of PCB-contaminated oil from a condensor  or percolation of wastes thru an unlined lagoon over 20 years, or was there a sudden release of hazardous materials from some containment structure or container.

Another  regulatory oddity is that cleanup standards and reporting obligations are not congruent so that there could be contamination above  above cleanup levels that may not be reportable because the contamination occurred over a very long period of time yet for some chemicals there may be a discharge that requires reporting but does not result in any risk-based cleanup obligation.  

As a result, owners and sellers of property with purely historical contamination take the position that they have no obligation to disclose the presence of the contamination even if the contamination is present in concentrations that exceed applicable cleanup standards. In the absence of a regulatory driver, the owner/seller can then contractually prohibit the buyer from disclosing the contamination unless an overburdened regulatory somehow stumbles across the contamination.

Now, some academics, government legislators and judges have expressed the view that this is really not that big a problem because the marketplace can address this issue. After all, they say, a buyer can always require a seller to disclose and cleanup a site. Of course, this ignores the practical market reality that buyers may not have the leverage to extract such concessions, may not realize they need such information or that they may even want to know.

I think the absence of reporting obligations for purely historical contamination has contributed to the creation of brownfields as owners can just abandon their properties and while the local real estate market may be aware of concerns, overtaxed regulators may have no clue about the potential contamination.

My suggestion is that we link reporting obligations to cleanup standards so that if a phase 2 discovers soil or groundwater contamination, the contamination must be reported.  No more time spend on trying to figure out how much of the chemical escaped into the ground or less time for lawyers to argue over how to deal with the results of the due diligence.

I also think that all phase 2 reports should  be required to be sent to a centralized state database. Just think of all the wasted time and money that goes into repeating phase 2 reports over the years. If a consultant was able to access a database and see that sampling had been collected in the past in a certain area, it could use that information to advise its client that there is no need to sample in a particular area or that the area was already sampled and recommend sampling in other areas to better delineate the contamination.

Why are we still discovering contaminated sites nearly 30 years after CERCLA? Why havent we cleaned up more sites? Why are there so many brownfield sites? I think the inadequate reporting obiligations are a bit reason.

What do you think?    

Developer Liable for Spreading Contaminated Dirt

A former property owner who inadvertently spreading contaminated dirt during grading activities for a residential development nearly thirty years ago could not assert the CERCLA third-party defense and was held liable as a former owner in United States v. Honeywell, 2008 LEXIS 13432 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2008).

In this case, Charles Bruner purchased an undeveloped parcel known as Ray Vista in 1978. The Ray Vista Site was located adjacent to the Mesa de Oro mound of mine tailings that had been generated by the Central Eureka Mine. At the time that Bruner purchased the site, the adjacent tailing mounds were covered with vegetation. However, aerial photos showed that the tailings had been subject to extensive erosion prior to 1977 that had allowed contaminated soils to migrate onto the development site.
 
Following his purchase of the property, Bruner retained contractors to excavate and grade the site to facilitate construction of streets and the installation of the underground utilities. He also contracted with the City of Sutter Creek for the construction of the streets, street lighting, sanitary sewers, water distribution pipes, and other utility distribution facilities. Thereafter, he built four homes on two streets in the subdivision.
 
In 1995, EPA discovered that contamination from the historical mining operations at the Site had migrated to the Vista Ray residential subdivision (“Vista Ray”). EPA implemented a response action which involved excavation of the contaminated soils from all of the residential lots, placement of clean soils as well as landscaping. The federal government then commenced a cost recovery suit against Honeywell International and other responsible parties. Honeywell and the defendants ultimately agreed to pay EPA $600K along with an additional $120K in funds collected from contribution actions that had been filed against other responsible parties. The only third-party defendant that refused to settle was Bruner, and the settling parties sought $160K in response costs.
 
Bruner argued that he was entitled to assert the innocent purchaser defense because he did not know or have reason to know of the presence of the contamination but the court did not reach that issue because he could not the first element of the third party defense. 
 
The innocent purchaser defense is technically part of the CERCLA third-party defense which provides that a person will not be liable if the defendant can show that the release was (1) solely caused by an act or omission of a third party (2) whom the defendant did not have any direct or indirect contractual relationship (3) that the defendant exercise due care with respect to the hazardous substances and (4) took precautions against the foreseeable acts or omissions of third. The innocent purchaser's defense is used to satisfy the second prong of the third party defense. If the defendant can show that it did not know or had no reason to know of contamination, it would be deemed to not be in a 'contractual relationship' with a person who caused the contamination.
 
Bruner argued that the contamination was solely due to mine operations. However, the court said the contaminated soil was spread either by Bruner's actions or those of his contractors. Distinguishing other cases were parties had been able to assert a defense based on the passive migration of the contaminants, the court said that Bruner took affirmative steps in developing his land. The court noted that he actively graded and excavated the property, that it was reasonable to expect that any contaminants in the soil would have been agitated and that it is eminently foreseeable that development of such land would result in a release of whatever hazardous substances were in the soil. 
 
Because Bruner could not show that a third party was the 'sole' cause of the release of from the Vista Ray subdivision, the court ruled there was no need to discuss whether he exercised due care or took the proper precautions to prevent such a release. Likewise, because the court found that Bruner had actively contributed to the 'release' of the hazardous substance at the time he undertook development, the issue of whether he had 'reason to know' of the presence of a hazardous substance was irrelevant. While the court held that Bruner was liable, it determined that there were genuine issues of material fact on the amount of Bruner's equitable share of the response costs and that further discovery was required before the Bruner share of the costs could be established.

This is one of those harsh cases that have given CERCLA a bad name and perhaps of the situations that Congress had hoped to ameliorate when it enacted the Innocent Landowners (ILO) Defense in 1986. Had the defendant been able to get past the 'solely caused by' prong, it might have been able to demonstrate that in 1978 it would not have had any reason to know of the contamination, especially since the mine tailings had been covered with vegetation. Since the decision was at the summary judgment stage, it is unlikely that sufficient discovery had been conducted to determine if Bruner had exercised due care.

Monday, October 18, 2010

Developer Who Did No Dilgence Turns to Litigation To Recover Damages For Contaminated Property

Back in August, I reported on the busted construction loan in Pennsylvania where a lender failed to require any environmental due diligence for property that was impacted by an off-site plume and the development now consists of unsold homes. http://www.linkedin.com/groupItem?view=&gid=41433&type=member&item=27076689&qid=1d2084d5-846e-4f45-9c12-825885e6b1ad&goback=%2Egna_41433
We all know that lender due diligence and underwriting standards were "lax" during the great real estate bubble of the past decade. However, I continue to be astounded by the indifference that developers exhibited to environmental issues since after all they were taking title to potentially contaminated land. Now that the developers have been stuck with cleanups and are unable to sell the homes, they are trying to use lawsuits to compensate for their lack of diligence. Following is a recent example of such a case. I will discuss another interesting case in a separate post.
In KB Homes v Rockville TBD Corp. George and Patricia Kopetsky (Kopetsky) purchased some unimproved farmland in 1989 that was adjacent to the defendant Rockville plant that manufactured airplane components. Kopetsky did not perform any environmental due diligence prior to acquiring the farm land.
As part of a 1993 asset sale, an environmental investigation determined that TCE had been discharged into the facility’s septic system located on the eastern portion of the property. In 1995, the defendant entered into the Indiana Voluntary Remediation Program of the facility and subsequently determined but the levels were below the cleanup standards. The septic system was decommissioned and the Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM) issued a Certificate of Completion in 1996. A subsequent investigation performed on the western portion of the property in 1997 and 1998 revealed a plume of TCE-contaminated groundwater that had migrated from the facility and beneath a portion of the Koetsky’s farmland.
In the meantime, the Kopetsky submitted a plat plan for a subdivision known as Cedar Park in 1998. After they received plat approval, Kopetsky entered into a lot purchase and option agreement with Dura Builders. In the agreement, Kopetsky represented that the Cedar Park land was free of any hazardous materials and promised that he would, at each closing, execute a vendor's affidavit certifying the environmental condition of the lot The affidavits stated, in part, that the land did not contain any hazardous waste or materials, and that no disclosure statement was required to be filed pursuant to the Indiana Responsible Property Transfer Law. Kopetsky also represented to their lender that “after due investigation and inquiry, no contamination was present at the property.
In 1999, Dura Builders began purchasing lots from Kopetsky but did not perform any environmental due diligence either before executing the lot purchase agreement or actually purchasing the individual lots. In 2002, a consultant retained by Cedar Park provided Kopetsky with groundwater monitoring results showing that a portion of the Cedar Park property was impacted with TCE-contaminated groundwater. A cleanup to non-residential standard was proposed but Kopetsky objected because since this would prevent the sale of the land for residential development. Kopetsky continued to sell lots to Dura Builders but did not notify Dura of the contamination.
In 2004, KB Homes acquired Dura Builders. KB did not conduct environmental due diligence prior to acquiring Dura Buildings. Indeed, KB did not learn of the contaminationuntil March 2005 when KB had performed its own sampling. KB was forced to halt construction as buyers were either unable to obtain financing or walked away from their contracts. In 2007, KB filed a complaint against Rockville, Kopetsky, and Patriot Engineering for negligence, trespass, nuisance, breach of contract and constructive fraud. KB requested damages for reduction in value of its property as a result of the TCE contamination; legal and consultant fees; fees paid to maintaining the lots and homes; and interest on the capital investment made unproductive by the contamination.
The trial court granted Rockville’s motion for summary judgment and KB appealed. The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed that the KB could not bring a trespass claim because it did not have possession of the land at the time that the activity that caused the contamination had occurred.
On the nuisance claim, the appeals court said the lower court erred when it found that Rockville could have not foreseen that a release of TCE could harm an adjoining property. However, the court went on that under Indiana law, the nuisance claims could not proceed because Rockville had sold the property in 1993 and the actions that caused the contamination had occurred prior to the time KB acquired the sale.
For the negligence claim, though, the appeals court said that the trial court had erred when it granted summary judgment. The trial court had that the damages that KB sought were economic in nature and therefore were not recoverable in a negligence action. Under the economic loss doctrine, parties may not use tort law to try to evade an allocation of risk that was negotiated in a contract. However, the appeals court said that KB did not have a contractual relationship with Rockville so its negligence claim was not an attempt to circumvent a contractual limitation. KB’s claims against Kopetsky and Patriot Engineering have yet to be resolved.